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McCarran-Ferguson is
Protecting the Wrong Health
Care Entities
R. Chad Nelson†
Abstract
Antitrust laws were established to promote and maintain a
competitive marketplace by protecting competition itself; however, in
regulating the health care industry, antitrust has missed its mark.
Despite the vast regulatory code keeping non-profit hospitals in
check by protecting government and patient interests, antitrust laws
do not provide substantial relief to these entities as they seek to ensure
high level care for patients within their economic realities and the
regulatory code. There are exceptions that acknowledge the realities of
non-profit hospitals – such as a Robinson-Patman Act exception
allowing non-profit hospitals to purchase pharmaceuticals at a
discounted rate – but the bulk of relief is provided to profit-driven
health insurers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In this way, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act has truly missed its mark. True economic
protection of patients would instead provide non-profit hospitals an
antitrust exception in order to promote the highest quality health care
within the regulatory code of the United States.
The Non-Profit Institutions Act, McCarran-Ferguson Act, and
public utility exceptions could be used as a baseline for creating a nonprofit hospital exception to the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. The
exception would provide that in conducting the business of health care,
non-profit hospitals may transact such business in any manner that is
allowed by health care regulations and maintains the best interest of
consumers.
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Introduction
Health care is a topic of constant conversation in the United States.
How is it best managed? What system provides the most comprehensive
coverage? Who should control that coverage? A less discussed, but no
less important, part of the system, is how best to regulate and protect
consumers while ensuring that hospitals are able to efficiently and
effectively operate.
While hospitals are businesses, this classification fails to appreciate
their importance to their respective communities. Providing health care
is a necessity for any community to live and, hopefully, thrive. The
industry’s “consumers” are patients, a distinction that underlies the
ultimate goal of a non-profit hospital – providing the best health
services to the most people. This distinction sets it apart from profitseeking industry.
While this distinction is important, it does not mean that non-profit
hospitals are businesses that need to go unmonitored, unrestrained, and
unchecked. Currently, non-profit hospitals are subject to a substantial
regulatory code that restricts its business practices in order to protect
consumers, the government, and taxpayers. These regulations are
designed to protect these parties while acknowledging the ways in which
hospitals need to operate through specific exceptions and safe harbors.
Antitrust laws also seek to protect consumers, but through the
regulation of competition. Non-profit hospitals simply don’t operate
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under the principles championed by antitrust. Instead, they stand as
an unnecessary obstacle to the non-profit hospital, even when operating
within the health care code. A budgetary crisis among hospitals is
complicated by antitrust laws that simply aren’t built for health care.
Courts have acknowledged this in various cases, but only very narrow
exceptions have been established.
This paper will demonstrate that these existing exceptions can be
brought together to build a workable antitrust exception for non-profit
hospitals that allows for greater business decision making while
continuing to operate in the best interest of the consumer, taxpayer,
and the government. The exception would provide that in conducting
the business of health care, non-profit hospitals may transact such
business in any manner that is allowed by health care regulations and
maintains the best interest of consumers.

I.

The Rules and Regulations at Play

The purpose of antitrust laws is to protect a competitive market,
thereby protecting the interests of market consumers, the government,
and taxpayers. These ideals do not translate to non-profit hospitals and
thereby miss their stated purpose within that industry. This misstep is
not due to a perfectly competitive marketplace in health care, but
rather a mis- categorization of non-profit hospitals. Non-profit hospitals
account for a majority of hospitals within the United States – many of
the most prestigious and largest hospitals, such as MD Anderson
Cancer Center and Cleveland Clinic, operate as non-profits.1 As with
other non-profit institutions, hospitals are required to conduct business
within a financial structure established and monitored by the IRS.2 If
the hospitals falls out of compliance with those rules, it loses its nonprofit status.3
In addition to IRS rules, non-profit hospitals are subject to a
complex regulatory code that seeks to protect consumer, government,
and taxpayer. The contracts that make up the functioning hospital are
all restricted by the terms of these regulations, requiring fair market
value compensation and assurances that financial relationships will not
result in fraudulent or unnecessary care that will be payable by
Medicare and Medicaid.4 At first glance, such terms may not appear
1.

Fast
Facts
on
U.S.
Hospitals, 2020, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (2020),
https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals
[https://perma.cc/AT8M-9ECE].

2.

In addition to the general requirements for non-profit organizations in
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), hospitals must also meet four additional requirements
imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as codified
in I.R.C. § 501(r)(1).

3.

Id.

4.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1320a-7b(b) (2018).
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cumbersome to the business of the hospital, but restrictions on
compensation for real estate, physicians, and other various equipment
hamstring what would be competitive aspects in other industries in
order to maintain compliance with patient protection and non-referral
laws.5 Although cumbersome, these targeted regulations are important,
keeping hospitals in check and protecting the best interests of
consumers, the government, and taxpayers.
Antitrust laws do not provide substantial relief to non-profit
hospitals as they seek to ensure high level care for patients within their
economic realities and the regulatory code. Instead, non-profit hospitals
are subject to the same antitrust laws as their profit-maximizing
counterparts – even to a greater degree than some within their own
industry such as insurance companies.6 Hospitals are still subject to
review of their mergers and acquisitions, market saturation tests, and
pricing laws.7 Such laws complicate and slow down the business
decisions necessary for non-profit hospitals to continue operating
efficiently. This is particularly true in the context of mergers and
acquisitions, which have become increasingly popular as the fiscal
burdens of hospital operations grows.8 Although transactions often are
allowed to proceed in the end, it does not mean that the same quality
of treatment will continue. 9
Currently, the majority of antitrust relief for health care entities is
reserved for health insurers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.10 Nonprofit hospitals only enjoy the benefits of the Non-Profit Institutions
Act, which is primarily used by hospitals for purchasing

5.

See Rachel V. Rose, The Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute: What Are
They and Why Do Health Care Industry Participants Need
to Know?, THE FED. LAW., July 2016, at 12, 13.

6.

Collin Z. Groebe, The Evolution of Federal Courts’ Healthcare Antitrust
Analysis: Does the PPACA Spell the End to Hospital Mergers?, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1617, 1631 (2015); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018).

7.

P.
Dileep
Kumar, Antitrust
Laws
in
Healthcare:
Evolving
Trends, AM. ASS’N. FOR PHYSICIAN LEADERSHIP (May 9, 2019),
https://www.physicianleaders.org/news/antitrust-laws-health-careevolving-trends [https://perma.cc/YZ6Q-4EJW].

8.

See Brent Kendall, Regulators See to Cool Hospital-Deal Fever, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 18, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
3863404577286071837740832[https://perma.cc/3QK5-P75Z].

9.

Sara Heath, How Do Healthcare Mergers and Acquisitions Impact
Patients?, PATIENT
ENGAGEMENT
HIT (Aug.
7,
2018),
https://patientengagementhit.com/news/how-do-healthcare-mergersand-acquisitions-impact-patients [https://perma.cc/7UEL-Q9PT].

10.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2018).
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pharmaceuticals at a discount.11 While this use is certainly helpful, it
only covers one aspect of a business.
A. Health Care Regulations

Health care is one of the most highly regulated industries –
protecting consumers (patients), the government, and taxpayers from
unscrupulous practices that could compromise patient care and
taxpayer/government dollars through Medicare. Pertinently, the
federal government has enacted a complex code that prevents
fraudulent or abusive practices that involve the federal health care
programs, namely Medicare and Medicaid.12 In 2013 (the last year data
was available), Medicare and Medicaid made up 57.2% of patient
revenue.13 Further, failure to comply with any of these regulations
results in settlements that can be in the multi-millions.14 Accordingly,
hospitals are very protective of their Medicare and Medicaid payments
and are aware of their need to strictly comply with any regulatory
scheme that threatens that.
Knowing this, the federal government uses Medicare and Medicaid
as a tool to force compliant relationships. The five most common
regulatory schemes are: 1) Stark Law, 2) Anti-Kickback Statute, 3)
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 4) False Claims Act,
and 5) Civil Monetary Penalties. Each affects hospitals in a unique way
that necessarily restricts their business capabilities.
1.

Stark Law

The first important federal regulation that pervades every business
decision made by a hospital system is the Physician Self-Referral Law,
colloquially known as the Stark Law.15 Pursuant to the Stark Law,
physicians are prohibited from making referrals to any entity with
which the physician has a financial relationship if the referral is for
11.

Stephen Barlas, The Avenue to Discounts For Non-Profit Hospital
Pharmacies: Meeting the Requirements of the Non-Profit Institutions
Act, 35 PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS 603 (2010).

12.

See Rose, supra note 5.

13.

Hospitals Hit a Revenue Crunch, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hospitals-hit-revenuecrunch [https://perma.cc/4H5C-JWX3].

14.

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Florida Hospital System Agrees to
Pay the Government $85 Million to Settle Allegations of Improper
Financial Relationship with Referring Physicians (Mar. 11, 2014); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Detroit Area Hospital System to Pay $84.5
Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Arising From Improper
Payments to Referring Physicians (Aug.2, 2018); Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., United States Resolves $237 Million False Claims Act
Judgment Against South Carolina Hospital That Made Illegal Payments
to Referring Physicians (Oct. 16, 2015).

15.

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
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certain designated health services payable by Medicare and Medicaid.16
Entities are prohibited from presenting, or causing to be presented,
claims to Medicare and Medicaid for those referred services.17 These
restrictions always apply to relationships between physicians and
entities in which they have a financial interest unless an enumerated
exception is met, such as the “bona fide employment” exception
allowing employment for identifiable services at a fair market rate that
does not take into account the volume or value of any referrals by the
physician.18 It is also important to note that the Stark Law is a strict
liability statute – a showing of intent in the transaction is unnecessary
– meaning that the only way to avoid liability under a referral
relationship is by meeting an exception.19
2.

Anti-Kickback Statute

Perhaps the most prevailing federal regulation of fraud and abuse
affecting the health care industry is the Anti-Kickback Statute
(“AKS”).20 A criminal law, the AKS prohibits knowing and willful
payment of anything of value to induce or reward patient referrals or
generate business payable by a federal health care program.21
Importantly, the AKS is not limited to physicians and designated health
services like the Stark Law, making it more pervasive in the business
transactions and relationships of a health care system and requiring fair
market value to avoid a violation.22 In limited circumstances, an AKS
violation can be avoided by falling within a safe harbor established and
enumerated by the Office of the Inspector General.23
3.

Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act

The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”)
states that anyone with an emergency medical condition, regardless of
their ability to pay, presenting to an emergency department must be
stabilized and treated.24 In the event that the emergency department is
incapable of stabilizing the patient due to a lack of specialized
capabilities, an appropriate transfer must be arranged.25 While the

16.

Id.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2019).

24.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2018).

25.

Id.
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scope may appear narrow, emergent cases, both involving physical and
mental health issues, cost hospitals $4.2 billion each year.26 This
practice highlights the business model of the non-profit hospital –
providing a service to as many patients as possible without regard for
profits.
4.

False Claims Act

To further protect the government from false or fraudulent
reimbursement claims to Medicare and Medicaid, the False Claims Act
(“FCA”) makes it illegal to submit claims for payment to Medicare and
Medicaid that the submitting party knows, or should know, are false or
fraudulent.27 There is no specific intent to defraud requirement and
“knowing” includes deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of the information.28
5.

Civil Monetary Penalties Law

Under the Civil Money Penalties Law (“CMP”), the Secretary of
Health and Human Services can impose civil money penalties,
assessments, and program exclusions for fraud and abuse violations
involving Medicare and Medicaid.29 There are three specific violations
under the CMP for submitting false or fraudulent claims, none of which
requires a specific intent to defraud.
B. Antitrust Laws

Much like the health care regulations, antitrust laws are designed
to protect consumers, the government, and taxpayers from fraud and
abuse. Unlike the health care regulations, antitrust laws are designed
to protect these interests through the competitive marketplace. Outside
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the antitrust laws are not designed
specifically for the health care industry, but they significantly impact
the industry. The restrictions placed on market movement, firm size,
and pricing affects the way that hospitals cope with the health care
regulations in attempting to remain viable entities to serve their
communities.30 There is not a dollar figure to be placed on this harm,
like the impact of the health care regulations; instead, the effect is a
limited business mobility and increased costs of assessing and
potentially fighting an antitrust challenge. Ultimately, this hurts the
26.

William (B.G.) TenBrink et al., Emergency Medicine Advocacy
Handbook,
EMRA, https://www.emra.org/books/advocacy-handbook
/impact-of-emtala/ [https://perma.cc/4LHQ-VPHK].

27.

31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018).

28.

Id.

29.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a–7a (2018).

30.

Jeffrey W. Brennan & Paul C. Cuomo, The ”Nonprofit Defense”,
in Hospital Merger Antitrust Litigation, 13 ANTITRUST 13, 14 (1999).
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consumer in the health care industry through a reduction of efficiency
and access by disrupting business and increasing expenses for the
hospitals in assessing, fighting, or being unable to follow through with
business decisions.
There are five antitrust laws that impact the health care industry:
1) Sherman Act, 2) Clayton Act, 3) Federal Trade Commission Act, 4)
Robinson-Patman Act, and 5) McCarran-Ferguson.
1.

Sherman Act

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (“Sherman Act”) seeks to
protect consumers from abuse by preserving the competitive
marketplace.31 Toward this end, the Sherman Act prohibits
anticompetitive agreements and conduct that monopolizes, or attempts
to monopolize, a particular market.32 The Sherman Act authorizes the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to bring suits to enjoin conduct in
violation of the Sherman Act, as well as authorizing private parties
injured by such illegal conduct to bring suits for treble damages. 33
2.

Clayton Act

Under Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (“Clayton
Act”), mergers and acquisitions are prohibited when they may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.34 When
examining mergers and acquisitions – particularly mergers between
direct competitors, called “horizontal mergers” – the agencies are
primarily concerned with whether the proposed merger is likely to
create or enhance market power or facilitate the exercise of such market
power.35 Like the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act authorizes the DOJ to
bring suits to enjoin conduct in violation, as well as authorizing private
parties injured by such illegal conduct to bring suits for treble
damages.36
The Hart-Scott Rodino Act (“HSRA”), an amendment to the
Clayton Act, allows for greater oversight of mergers that may lead to
harmful effects on the market.37 The HSRA requires notification to the
antitrust agencies prior to merger if the potential merger meets certain

31.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

15 U.S.C. §18 (2018).

35.

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Aug.
19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontalmerger-guidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/89XR-XSJF].

36.

15 U.S.C. § 18.

37.

15 U.S.C. § 18a.
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relevant market thresholds.38 This effectively slows down mergers and
acquisitions, as the parties cannot consummate the transaction until
approval has been given by the agencies.39
3.

The Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) is primarily
known for creating the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission’)
itself.40 In doing so, the FTC Act empowers the Commission to, in
pertinent part, prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce, as well as seek relief for
conduct that injures consumers.41
The DOJ and Commission draft guidelines for when mergers and
acquisitions are likely to be challenged.42 The guidelines take into
account geography and market, but do not account for non-profit status
or an entity’s objective – only its behavior.43
4.

Robinson-Patman Act

The Robinson-Patman Act makes it illegal for “any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.”44
Non-profit hospitals do enjoy an exception to the Robinson-Patman
Act under the Non-Profit Institutions Act. The exception applies to
purchases of their supplies for their own use.45 This exception is
commonly used in the purchasing of pharmaceuticals.46
5.

McCarran-Ferguson Act

The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides a limited exception to
insurance companies from antitrust. To qualify for this exception, the
activity must be part of the business of insurance and be authorized
and regulated by the state.47 The effect of this exception is that conduct
that would normally violate the antitrust laws is exempted from action

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018).

41.

Id.

42.

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 35.

43.

Id.

44.

15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).

45.

15 U.S.C. § 13c.

46.

See Barlas, supra note 11.

47.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015.
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by the antitrust agencies if the conduct is within the scope authorized
by the applicable state law.48

II. Obstacles Facing Hospitals
Health care is a unique business.49 While it is a business, it does not
operate under the same principles, assumptions, or models as other
businesses.50 Antitrust law concerns itself with protecting competition
as a means of protecting consumers, the government, and taxpayers.
Health care does not operate on the same plane in terms of competition
and the best way to protect its stakeholders. Health care regulations
take into account the ideals, purpose, and model of non-profit hospitals
while still protecting consumers, the government, and taxpayers from
fraudulent or unscrupulous practices.
Understanding this difference is more important than ever, as the
landscape of health care, and non-profit hospitals in particular, shifts.51
Non-profit hospitals are currently faced with declining reimbursement
from Medicare and Medicaid and a growing compliance burden.52 These
challenges place significant financial strains on hospitals, which forces
them to make business decisions in ways not previously common. For
instance, the model has shifted toward favoring large hospital systems
as a way of improving efficiencies and better providing services to a
community.53
A.

The Dichotomy of Health Care and Competition

Competition and the protection of consumers do not go hand-inhand in the context of the health care industry like they do in other

48.

Id.

49.

See Molly Gamble, How Much Should We Expect Healthcare to Mimic
Other Industries?, BECKER’S
HOSP.
REV., (Aug.
19,
2013),
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/
hospital-managementadministration/how-much-should-we-expect-healthcare-to-mimic- otherindustries.html.

50.

Id.

51.

Jeff Lagasse, Struggles will Continue for Nonproft Hospitals in 2019, Fitch
Says, HEALTHCARE
FIN. (Dec.
8,
2018),
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/struggles-will-continuenonprofit-hospitals-2019-fitch-says [https://perma.cc/CX93-J53J].

52.

Meg Bryant, Fitch: Worst may be over for nonprofit hospitals,
HEATHCARE DIVE (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.healthcaredive.com/
news/fitch-worst-may-be-over-for-nonprofit-hospitals/551382/
[https://perma.cc/5XB4-HNVT].

53.

See Kendall, supra note 8.
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industries.54 Health care is complicated by the ultimately altruistic
nature of the services provided and necessity of those services to a
community. While they may appear similar – competition seeks to
generate the best possible product at the best possible price and health
care seeks to provide quality, affordable services to as many as possible
– the ideals that feed them and their necessity to a community clash,
highlighting the stark difference between them: profits.
1.

Competition Ideals

Competition is at the heart of capitalism, at the heart of the
American dream, and the very basis for the antitrust laws. The mantra
of antitrust law, after all, is to protect competition, not competitors.55
The purpose of competition, ideally, is to generate the best product for
the best possible price – ultimately protecting the consumer.56 The
antitrust laws seek to protect these ideals by ensuring that competitors
cannot transact in unsavory ways to monopolize a market.57
Competition for market-share, and ultimately the competition for
profits, creates perverse incentives for businesses to act in a predatory
fashion toward competitors, harm consumers, and enter into business
relationships that are not in the best interest of the consumer, but only
in the best interest of the bottom line. 58
2.

Health Care Ideals

Non-profit hospitals are uniquely situated among American
industry. They are differentiated by two primary factors: 1) they are
not profit- seeking and 2) their entire business model is focused on an
altruistic notion of providing quality health care to those who need it.59
It is important to distinguish revenue from profit – revenue is important
to non-profit hospitals, but only in order to cover the expenses
necessary to provide the quality health care to members of the
community.60 Profit-seeking goes beyond the expenses and seeks to
54.

Leemore S. Dafny & Thomas H. Lee, Health Care Needs Real
Competition, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/
health-care-needs-real-competition [https://perma.cc/843N-WCMG].

55.

Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).

56.

See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).

57.

See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
LAW ¶402 (3rd ed. 2007).

58.

See Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338
(7th Cir. 1986).

59.

Gamble, supra note 49.

60.

Claire Boyte-White, Revenue vs. Profit: What’s the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/
answers/122214/what-difference-between-revenue-and-profit.asp
[https://perma.cc/7TZN-3HQG].

HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
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generate more than enough revenue for services in order to enrich the
beneficiaries of those profits.61
Those two factors put non-profit hospitals at odds with traditional
profit-seeking business, even profit-seeking health care entities such as
insurance companies. An example of these factors at play can be seen
in the Mission & Values of one of the largest non-profit hospital systems
in the Midwest:
Through our participation in the healing ministry of Jesus Christ,
communities, especially those that are economically, physically
and socially marginalized, will experience improved health in
mind, body, spirit and environment within the financial limits of
the system.62

This mission echoes the ideals at the forefront of health care,
particularly for non-profit hospitals. For all of the philanthropic good
that American industry does in their respective communities, health
care is built on the very function of caring for those who need help. The
ideal of bettering the community is not just a part of the business – it
is the business of non-profit hospitals. When a non-profit hospital is
arguably operating at its peak performance, it is providing the widest
variety of quality services to the most members of the community while
simply covering the cost of providing those services.
Hospitals are big, with revenue streams in the billions.63 Hospitals
do compete to provide the best and most desirable services in their
community; however, this is not a competitive market for profit, and
the basis for all non-profit hospitals is providing the best possible care
to the most community members possible within their economic
realities. This is also what society wants – the best possible, affordable
care. Such an efficiency aligns with the goals and ideals of all parties
involved. While the ultimate purpose of competition, to deliver the best
product at the lowest possible price, appears to align with this goal, the
underlying product (health care services) distinguishes it from
traditional business. Competition of that kind could yield unscrupulous
results when health is the product and ultimately diverts from the goal
of providing quality health care for as many in the community as
possible.

61.

Id.

62.

Our
Mission
&
Values, SSM
HEALTH (2018),
https://www.ssmhealth.com/resources/about/mission-values
[https://perma.cc/4UBA-MRSW].

63.

SUTTER HEALTH AND AFFILIATES INTERIM UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (June 30,
2018),
https://emma.msrb.org/ER1149213-ER898992-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XX3L-Y5FH].
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Further distancing non-profit hospitals from American industry is
a hospital’s consumer base: patients seeking medical treatment.64
Patients are protected from predatory, profit-motivated decisions by
providers by the Stark Law, AKS, and the other rules and regulations
discussed above which monitor financial relationships that could
incentivize providers to administer care other than that which is in the
best interest of the patient. The very financial relationships on which
competitive advantage would be built are constrained by burdensome
regulations in the name of protecting the patients. All of this is
necessary in protecting patients, but it does distinguish non-profit
hospitals from typical American industry and increases the burden of
fulfilling health care’s ideals.
B.

The Changing Landscape of Hospitals

It is no secret that the landscape of health care in the United States
has been changing in recent years.65 For instance, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act fundamentally changed aspects of the way
Americans are insured, how many people are covered under Medicare
and Medicaid, increased the standards for non-profit status as a
hospital, and decreased the standard of liability under the AKS from
specific intent or actual knowledge to strict liability.66 Also, while the
Stark Law has been around since 1988, its implementation has taken
shape as recently as 200767 when the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) rolled out their final implementation phase.68 These
changes and growing regulatory codes have placed resource and
business strains on hospitals that are seeing slow growth and declining
margins.69 Further, hospitals have seen their reimbursements for
Medicare and Medicaid fall as CMS has failed to keep their payment
schedules in line with inflation. 70
64.

See Gamble, supra note 49.
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Hospitals have dealt with the burden of legislative changes, growing
regulations, and declining Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements.
These burdens have left non-profit hospitals struggling, with smaller
hospitals fighting just to keep their doors open.71 Left searching for
larger systems to support them, some communities are losing their local
access to quality health care.72 Even larger systems are losing money,
in some instances hand-over-fist.73 Facing these issues, hospitals have
moved away from simpler community models to large health care
systems.
1.

The Growing Compliance Burden

Given the penalties at stake when violations are discovered,
hospitals must be more vigilant than ever to remain compliant. This is
no small task – each transaction from a time-share, to on-call
agreements, to pharmaceutical contracts, and each physician agreement
must be examined for fair market value and any other potential
violations.74 Maintaining such compliance requires people with expertise
in the industry, legal fees, and increased overall number of employees
due to the inevitable rise in work load.75 This burden becomes greater
if a community hospital is found out of compliance and must pay fines
or loses its ability to participate in Medicare or Medicaid.76
2.

Diminishing Payments and the Growing Burden on Providers

Reimbursement rates for Medicare and Medicaid are established
based on a “Physician Fee Schedule” posted by CMS.77 In theory, these
rates should adjust according to inflation in order to maintain proper
reimbursement for providers; however, this has not been the case in the
past several years.78 Reimbursement rates have flatlined and failed to
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keep up with inflation, leaving providers short large swaths of hospital
income.79 Another disturbing result is the impact this has on commercial
insurance reimbursements.80 Commercial insurers often model their
schedules based on CMS, so while they are not identical, a CMS
schedule that has not been adjusted for inflation can lead commercial
insurers to follow suit.81 This leads to even more catastrophic results for
a hospital’s income.
The issue of missing income is not limited to reimbursement rates.
Hospitals large and small across the United States have reported
striking operation losses. In fiscal year 2016, MD Anderson Cancer
Center lost $266 million, Prestigious Partners HealthCare in Boston
lost $108 million, and the Cleveland Clinic suffered a 71% decline in its
operating income – these represent some of the most prestigious
hospitals in the country.82
Rural hospitals have been hit even harder, given their shallower
pockets and typically lower-income patients. For instance, in 2018 the
Pauls Valley General Hospital in Pauls Valley, OK (“PVGH”) resorted
to a GoFundMe page in a desperate attempt to keep its doors open and
continue serving its community.83 PVGH attempted for months to find
a larger system to join in order to stay afloat, but by that time there
was too much debt to make an acquisition financially viable for even a
large hospital network.84 As a result, PVGH closed its doors in October
2018, and now its community members must drive as many as 20 miles
to receive quality health care.85
3.

Fiscal Sensibilities and Large Hospital Networks

Given the economic burdens placed on non-profit hospitals by
dropping reimbursement and increased compliance issues, deeper coffers
and larger revenues are necessary to continue providing quality health
care to the community. Large hospital networks inherently have 1) a
level of revenue that can sustain certain losses, 2) large in-house legal
and compliance teams, and 3) the expertise to manage the general
affairs of the hospital efficiently. Much like economies of scale theory
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for products,86 the cost of maintaining compliance and absorbing
declining reimbursement can be better absorbed as the size (and
therefore revenue) increases. The efficiencies of a large non-profit
hospital system provide the best opportunity for quality care at the
best possible price while the consumer, taxpayer, and government are
protected by the more targeted health care regulations, large hospital
systems.

III. The Solution: Antitrust Exception for Non-Profit
Hospitals
In order to address the changing landscape of hospitals, a
streamlining of the regulatory desires covering health care needs to
occur. The business practices of non-profit hospitals are necessarily
restricted and watched by health care regulations to keep the industry
in check and their priorities in line for the consumer, government, and
taxpayers. Where the industry could be positively affected is an
exception from the antitrust laws, allowing for greater business decision
making within the already thorough regulatory code, but without the
inefficiencies created by the antitrust laws for this particular industry.
There are examples of industries that have been found to operate
more efficiently or in the best interest of the government, taxpayers,
and consumers outside of the burdens of antitrust. Utility companies
and their services have proven most beneficial to their customers when
efficiencies are maximized.87 Another example hits especially close to
hospitals, in the form of a profit-seeking sector of the health care
industry – health insurance.88 Non-profit hospitals have even been the
beneficiary of one narrower exception – the Non-Profit Institutions
Act.89 Each exception provides a basis on which an exception for nonprofit hospitals could be crafted.
A.

The Utility of Health

Public utility companies, both public and private, have long been
allowed to operate as natural monopolies.90 This has been allowed for
86.

Economies of scale is defined as “the reduction of production costs that is
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the sake of efficiency, as “[a] natural monopoly exists when average
costs continuously fall as the firm gets larger.”91 There are two primary
characteristics inherent in utilities that separate them as a natural
monopoly: 1) having only one set of electrical lines reduces capital costs
and makes transmission of electricity more efficient and 2) maintaining
this efficiency is essential to the public in avoiding blackouts and other
disruptive electrical events.92 To offset the potential harms of a
monopoly to consumers and the economy as a whole, utility companies
are heavily regulated on both the state and federal levels.93
Compare these characteristics with non-profit hospitals. Hospitals
operate at their peak when they can provide the most quality services
to their patients under one roof – while maintaining “roofs” in as many
communities as possible. Hospitals also provide an essential service to
the public as a whole – health and personal well-being.94 Much like
electricity, health and well-being are essential to a community’s
economy.95 Unlike electricity, health and well-being are essential to the
very basis that forms a community, as a community cannot exist
without healthy people. These similarities allow for an initial
comparison in crafting an exception for non- profit hospitals and
understanding its underlying policy – an exception is not to bloat
pocketbooks but rather to increase efficiency for a necessary service.
B.

Learning from the McCarran-Ferguson Act

Protecting profit-maximizing institutions at the federal level has
placed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in hot water with many politicians
and various other critics in recent years.96 McCarran-Ferguson has been
wasted on a profit-maximizing industry, but its principles could lay the
groundwork for advances in the most important aspect of the health
care industry in non- profit hospitals. There are basic tenants of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act that shed light on the viability of an antitrust
exception for non-profit hospitals.
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The two requirements to qualify for protection under the
McCarran- Ferguson Act – 1) activity in the business of insurance and
2) activity authorized and regulated by the state – create a baseline
from which to work.97 In creating protection for non-profit hospitals,
the “business of insurance”, as used in McCarran-Ferguson, could be
translated to the “business of health care” – this would protect
stakeholder from hospitals stretching the exception to conduct other
business in ways not intended. For instance, by limiting the conduct
covered, hospitals could not acquire real estate not intended for medical
practice. The exception would only cover the conduct intended, which
consists of that which drives the efficiency of patient care.
Further, non-profit hospitals are heavily regulated by state and
federal bodies that seek to protect patients from not only malpractice,
but deceptive or otherwise unsavory business practices. These
regulations are vast and monitor most all business conducted by a
hospital.98 Most importantly, these regulations are already in place and
being followed – there would not need to be a major overhaul in
operations that would disrupt the industry detrimentally.
C.

The Promise of the Non-Profit Institutions Act

Carving out an antitrust exception for non-profit hospitals is not a
new idea for lawmakers.99 In 1938, Congress passed an exception – the
Non- Profit Institutions Act – to the Robinson-Patman Act allowing
non-profit hospitals to purchase supplies for their own use without
availing themselves to liability under the Robinson-Patman Act.100 The
Non-Profit Institutions Act is limited in scope, allowing an exception
only for “supplies” for the non-profit hospital’s “own use.”101Through
its limiting language, the exception confronts the realities of operating
a non-profit hospital and allows the hospital to save on its
pharmaceuticals, but it prevents the hospital from engaging in anticompetitive behavior by shopping those pharmaceuticals to other
hospitals at a price that undercuts the initial seller.102
D.

The Non-Profit Institutions Act Beyond the Robinson-Patman Act

The health care industry, as it pertains to non-profit hospitals, can
be distinguished from typical industry, not only in its non-profitmaximizing organization, but also its base mission, values, goals, and
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consumers.103 The Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts seek to protect the
market, and protect consumers from the ills of unhealthy acts. The
argument is that the more players that are in a particular market, the
better protected consumers are from such ills.104 Non-profit hospitals do
not function under that same mindset. Their purpose is to serve and
better the community in the most efficient way possible. As health care
becomes more complex, the focus needs to be on efficiency and creating
better access to resources.
For decades, the courts have acknowledged what the merger
guidelines have failed to take into account: allowing for a non-profit
defense in antitrust.105 It has even been argued that non-profit hospitals
have been given a pass on antitrust challenges by the courts.106 In 1995,
Butterworth Health Corporation ostensibly opened the floodgates with
its “non-profit defense” to a proposed merger with Blodgett Memorial
Medical Center.107 The non-profit defense – which was material but not
dispositive – argued that the involvement of prominent community
members on the boards of non-profit hospitals provided accountability
against predatory price structuring and allowed for greater
efficiencies.108 The court agreed and acknowledged that “nonprofit
hospitals operate differently in highly- concentrated markets than do
profit-maximizing firms.”109 This defense has developed into five
arguments enveloped in the “non-profit defense”: 1) non-profit hospitals
are not profit maximizers; 2) governing boards are benevolent; 3)
community commitments will protect consumers; 4) price concentration
data refute traditional assumptions; and 5) efficiencies will directly
benefit consumers.110
Each of the arguments in the non-profit defense underscore the
principles differentiating non-profit hospitals from the profit
maximizing, non-altruistic, non-necessity-based industries that make up
the intended targets of antitrust law. Because the expansion and
streamlining of health care services through large networks of hospitals,
healthplexes, and clinics provide purchasing power in negotiating
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discounts that can be used to pass savings along to patients,
monopolization should be encouraged for the most capable non-profit
hospitals.111 Further, the essence of health care’s purpose and its
necessity to the community should provide non-profit hospitals the
latitude to make the best possible business decisions to continue serving
its community within the regulatory code. Patients are heavily
protected by the health care regulations that restrain the manner in
which hospitals conduct business, much like utility companies. The
unique and complex fiscal challenges that face non-profit hospitals due
to growing compliance burdens, dwindling reimbursement rates, and
slowed growth demand a step toward allowing actions that would
otherwise violate antitrust law, to the extent that they comply with the
health care regulations.
To envelop these principles, the Non-Profit Institutions Act,
McCarran- Ferguson Act, and public utility exceptions could be used
as a baseline for creating this exception to the Sherman, Clayton, and
FTC Acts. The exception would provide that in conducting the business
of health care, non- profit hospitals may transact such business in any
manner allowed by the health care regulations that amounts to the best
interest of consumers. The “best interest of consumers” takes into
account the impact of the transaction on the cost of patient care, the
quality of patient care, and the availability of patient care. At the heart
of any health care oversight must be the consumer. By taking the
existing exceptions, existing health care regulations, and placing the
interest of consumer patients at the forefront, health care business can
operate more efficiently and ultimately provide better care to
communities.

Conclusion
When looking at specific industries, it is important to understand
who their consumers are, the necessity of their products or services, and
how their products or services impact consumers. Health care becomes
an obviously special industry when answering these three questions.
Their consumers are patients and their products and services are of the
greatest necessity on both an individual and community level.
In order to facilitate necessary service, the government always
needs to be reviewing how those services are provided, monitored, and
checked. Non-profit hospitals are among the most prevalent and most
prestigious entities providing those services; not coincidentally, they are
also some of the most regulated. These regulations are necessary to
protect consumers, the government, and taxpayers from fraudulent or
otherwise unscrupulous business dealings that would compromise
services.
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While the health care regulations are necessary, they are
burdensome to comply with, particularly given the dismal fiscal realities
of non-profit hospitals. Given the fiscal burdens, certain business
ventures have become necessary in order to survive and serve a
community. Antitrust serves as an unnecessary obstacle toward this
end. The complex health care regulatory code is already working to
monitor the market – an idea that has been acknowledged by the courts.
Changes are a necessary step to avoiding the closure of more hospitals
like PVGH. Although there are certainly other obstacles, allowing for
less regulation and more business freedom is a key step in the right
direction.
Antitrust should expound upon its existing exceptions and those
created by the courts to allow non-profit hospitals to act in a manner
that allows for their survival and ultimately best serves their consumers,
the government, and taxpayers. The Non-Profit Institutions Act,
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and public utility exceptions could be used as
a baseline for creating this exception to the Sherman, Clayton, and
FTC Acts. The exception would provide that in conducting the business
of health care, non-profit hospitals may transact such business in any
manner that is allowed by health care regulations and maintains the
best interest of consumers.
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